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rule, protecting the owner if the parties could actually be placed
in their original positions, or the creditor, if, through no fault of
his own, he could not be restored to his original position. This
approach would also give effect to the additional requirement of
the bona fide purchaser rule stated by the Supreme Court 2 which,
it is submitted, should be limited to cases involving a giving in
payment.8
8
Robert A. Seale, Jr.
TORTS - THE EMERGENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY IN
PRODUCTS CASES
Today a consumer is apt to select an item because of the
glowing descriptions of a television commercial, or because of
enticing packages and displays.' Courts are aware that, with
the advent of mass advertising through radio, television, maga-
zines, and billboards, consumers purchase specialized products
manufactured miles away from the retail outlet by processes
only experts understand 2 and that, consequently, only manu-
facturers, and not the ultimate consumers, are able to evaluate
the worth, quality, and fitness of the products. 3 As a result,
manufacturers are being held to a greater degree of care to the
end that their products fulfill their representations and are free
from harmful defects.
4
Traditionally, the two theories, warranty-contract and negli-
gence-tort, that were available to a person injured by a defec-
tive product, equally required the person to be in privity with
the manufacturer. The origin of the privity requirement is un-
certain ;5 it is clear, however, that growth in the area of prod-
ucts liability has been marked by the gradual elimination of the
32. See note 19 supra.
33. The following example will illustrate the need for this limitation. If a
third party in good faith and without notice of any infirmity in the title of goods
pays cash for them, he is undoubtedly a bona fide purchaser for value. If the
rule required that this party be placed in a worse position before being protected
as a bona fide purchaser for value, this would clearly be contra the established
rule. See note 1 supra.
1. See Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961).
2. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
3. See Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612 (1958).
4. Witherspoon, Do You Have A Products Liability Case?, 36 Miss. L.J. 30,
33 (1964).
5. See Comment, 27 Mo. L. REv. 193 (1962).
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privity requirement in both warranty6 and negligence7 actions.
Winterbottom v. Wright" represents the traditional position of
nineteenth century courts, perhaps as a measure to protect
growing industries, to refuse relief to an ultimate user in a
negligence-tort action9 against the manufacturer on the basis
that no privity existed.' For seventy-four years afterwards
it was virtually impossible for one not in privity to recover
in a tort action from a manufacturer. An exception" to the
general rule of nonliability held the manufacturer liable in the
absence of privity if he negligently manufactured an imminently
dangerous product. 12 The increased number of cases fitting into
this exception signaled the gradual abrogation of the privity
requirement in negligence-tort actions, especially in the area
of deleterious food and drugs.'8
In 1916, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' 4 a negligence ac-
tion by one not in privity against the manufacturer of a defec-
tive automobile, expressly eliminated the privity requirement
in negligence cases. MacPherson held that liability would be
6. Id. at 195.
7. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
8. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
9. Page Keeton points out that negligence and warranty were the only two
alternatives on which products cases could he based in the nineteenth century.
Keeton, Products Liability-Current Developments, 40 TExAs L. REv. 193
(1961).
10. Lord Abinger stated: "[U]nless we confine the operation . . . to the
parties who entered into them [contracts], the most absurd and outrageous con-
sequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." Winterbottom v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842). While Winterbottom is often cited as the
fountainhead of products liability, it is significant to note that liability of the
manufacturer was not at issue. Defendant's sole obligation was to keep a mail
coach in good working order.
11. Huest v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903)
1 FBUMEB & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.02 (1964).
12. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 357, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852). There
were two other types of cases in which recovery was allowed in the absence
of privity: first, when the manufacturer knew that the product was imminently
dangerous and failed to disclose that fact; and second, when the defendant
manufacturer furnished a defective product for use on his own premises. See
Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896) (bed represented as safe);
Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 350, 51 N.W. 1102 (1892) (ladder with
defects painted over) ; Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124 (1874) (defec-
tive scaffold). These cases seem to involve a breach of an affirmative duty
and the question of privity was not the major issue.
13. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852), involv-
ing the manufacturer of drugs who labeled a poison harmless. The court
held that a duty arose, not from privity, which was lacking, but rather from the
nature of the business in relation to the public trust which was placed in druggists.
14. 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) : "We have put aside
the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of
negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have
put the source of the obligation . . . in the law."
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imposed if the manufacturer should have foreseen that in the
absence of care in manufacturing the product would cause in-
jury to life and limb,15 and thereby discarded the previousre-
quirement that the product would have to be considered inher-
ently dangerous.' 6 The foreseeability doctrine of MacPherson
Was soon expanded to allow recovery for property damage. 17
Since MacPherson the bulk of litigation in this area has been
based in tort:18 courts have recognized that the law imposes a
duty on the manufacturer or supplier 9 of exercising reasonable
Care to furnish objects2 that can be safely used for the desig-
nated purpose2 1 by the expected user,22 or in the alternative, to
supply instructions or adequate warning of dangers attending
their use.23 The applications of the principle of MacPherson
include cases in which the manufacturer should have exercised
reasonable care24 to prevent: (1) a defect which would have
15. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
16. Cf. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir.
1903).
17. See E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26 (8th Cir.
1934) (a spray containing a chemical substance that killed flowers as well as
the insects it was designed to kill).
18. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABIITY (1964); Noel, Recent
Trends in Manufacturer's Negligence as to Design, Instructions and Warnings,
19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965).
19. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 390 (1965), has adopted the position that
the supplier should 'be held liable as well as the seller. See Golembe v. Blumberg,
262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1941).
20. The objects need not be inherently dangerous. See note 17 supra. See
Jamison v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (rubber exer-
ciser) ; Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y. Supp. 496 (1930)
(toy revolver which emitted sparks).
21. The rubber exerciser in Jamison v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23
(D.C. Cir. 1957) is an excellent example of a product not safe for its designated
purpose, because the foot support was loose and the rubber caused the foot support
to hit the user in the face.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 390 (1965) : "One who supplies directly
or through a third person for the use of another whom the supplier knows or
from the facts known to him should know to be likely because of his youth,
inexperience or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share
in, or be endangered by its physical use, is subject to liability for harm resulting
to them." See Anderson v. Settergren, 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907);
Pitts v. Basile, 55 Ill. App. 2d 37, 204 N.E.2d 43 (1965) ; Semeniuk v. Chentis,
1 Il1. App. 2d 508, 117 N.E.2d 883 (1954).
. 23. For a comprehensive discussion as to when warnings or instruction have
been found to be necessary, see Comment, 18 LA. L. REv. 588 (1958).24. If a foreseeable injury due to a breach of the duty to use reasonable
care occurred without intervening negligence, the breach was considered to be
the proximate cause of the injury. In Stewart v. DuPlessis, 42 Ill. App. 2d 192,
198, 191 N.E.2d 622, 626 (1963) the court said: "However, the intervention
of independent concurrent or intervening forces will not break -the causal connec-
tion (between the original wrong and the injury) if the intervention of such
forces was, itself, probable or foreseeable. ... [T]he test to be applied is whethei
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been discovered by a reasonable inspection of the product,25 (2)
continued use of a known unsafe design,26 (3) negligent mis-
representations of safety,27 (4) harm caused by the nature of
the product2 or by the immaturity of the expected user,29 when
the harm could have been avoided by adequate warnings or in-
structions. Since liability in cases relying on MacPherson rests
on negligence, the plaintiff must show fault, but he has been
assisted through the application of res ipsa loquitur30 However,
in many cases the manufacturer is able to present enough evi-
dence to rebut the inference created by res ipsa loquitur, thereby
the first wrongdoer might reasonably anticipate the intervening cause as a natural
and probable consequence of his own negligence." For a discussion of proximate
cause and its determination, see Comment, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 397 n.18 (1963).
25. See Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930) (tractor steer-
ing wheel broke when pressure was applied owing to defective composition) ; Biller
v. Allis Chalmers, 34 Ill. App. 2d 47, 180 N.E.2d 46 (1962) (defective valve
caused propane to spill on plaintiff's hands) ; Brown v. Sterling Abrasives, 5 Ill.
App. 2d 1, 124 N.E.2d 607 (1955) (grinding wheel shattered owing to a defect).
26. See Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951) (drum
of sulphuric acid burst after similar drums had burst in the past). See, e.g., 2
HARPER & JAMEs, LAW OF TORTS § 28.13 (1956) ; 1 FUumER & FRIEDMAN, PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY § 12.01(2) (1964).
27. See Crist v. Art Model Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y. Supp. 496
(1930) (toy revolver that emitted sparks, advertised as absolutely safe for use
by children, ignited Santa suit child was wearing).
28. The obviousness of the danger has played a large part in the past in deter-
mining the duty that was to be imposed. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of De-
sign or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 836 (1962) : "It is
frequently asserted that a design is not unreasonably dangerous because the risk
is one which anyone immediately would recognize and avoid. For example, it is
clear that there is no duty to provide a protective covering or a warning with a
sharp knife ... , and it is evident that the sharpness of such an instrument is
not a defect." It seems, therefore, that the courts must make an initial deter-
mination as to how the nature of the product will be classified- dangerous or
not dangerous.
29. The immaturity of the user is also determinative of what reasonable pre-
cautions must be taken. It is logical that if children are intended users of the
product more precautions must be taken than if the product is intended for adult
use. See Pitts v. Basile, 55 Ill. App. 2d 37, 204 N.E.2d 43 (1965) (liability for
darts labeled KIDDY PACKAGE- no warning -manufacturer should have
known that children would buy) ; Semeniuk v. Chentis, 1 Ill. App. 2d 508, 117
N.E.2d 883 (1954) (foreseeable that selling a BB gun to an eight-year-old without
instruction would result in injury to passerby).
30. The effect of the doctrine is stated in Mabee v. Sutliff & Case Co., 404
Ill. 27, 31, 88 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1949) : "[11n a case within the maxim .. . , proof
of the circumstances of such case and of the injury constitutes a prima facie case
of negligence, and will justify a verdict unless such prima facie case is overcome
by proof showing that the party charged is not at fault." The so-called "prima
facie" case is overcome when "it is true that the defendants presented evidence
tending to show it exercised considerable precaution .... It is well settled, how-
ever, that when a defendant produces evidence to rebut the inference of negligence
which arises upon the application of the doctrine ... it is ordinarily a question
of fact for the jury." Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461
(1964) ; 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.03 (1946) ; Comment.
25 LA. L. REv. 748. (1965).
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weakening plaintiff's position when the issue of negligence is
submitted to the jury.31
In addition to negligence-tort, plaintiffs may bring action on
a warranty-contract basis, thereby eliminating the necessity of
showing fault on the part of the manufacturer.8 2 The earliest
cases brought in warranty emphasized the importance of privity
and cited tort cases 33 beginning with Winterbottom v. Wright.24
In warranty-contract actions 5 the courts adopted the position
that one not "in privity" of contract could not maintain an action
for breach of contract; therefore one not a party to a sale could
not maintain an action in warranty. 6 This reasoning denied
to a third party the application of the two warranties available
in a contract action - the warranty of merchantability and the
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.37
Soon the courts found privity in food cases88 through con-
cepts of agency,39 assignment, 4° and third-party beneficiary,4 '
31.. Murphy v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1963) ;
Huffstutler v. Hercules Powder Co., 305 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Williams v.
United States Royal Tire Co., 101 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
32. See George v. Willman, 379 P.2d 103 (Alaksa 1963) ; 1 FaumER & FuIm-
MAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 16.01 (1964).
33. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
Even when the action was brought in warranty the courts have used a mixture
of tort and contract language. See Beck v. Spindler, 265 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d
670 (1959). Several writers and cases agree that the reason the courts spoke in
warranty terms was that the action for breach of warranty was originally tortious
in nature; however, with the growth of the action of assumpsit, providing a rem-
edy in pure contract, the warranty, which was designed to impose liability where
a product failed to measure up to representations of the manufacturer caused
injury, came to be considered rather a part of the contract of sale than a basis
of recovery in tort. See Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961)
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958)
1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 16.03 (1) (1964) ; PRossFR, TourTs
§ 84 (2d ed. 1955) ; Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YAIZ L.J. 1099, 1126
(1960).
34. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
35. See American Tank Co. v. Revert Oil Co., 108 Kan. 690, 196 Pac. 1111
(1921).
36. 1 FRULER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIAILITY § 16.03(2) (1964), recog-
nizes that this reasoning has been applied by the courts but attacks it as being
incorrect.
37. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 315; Corman, Implied Sales War-
ranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 219; Prosser, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
38. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928)
1 FUREau & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 23.01 (1) (1964).
39. See Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 312 (1943) ; Bowman v.
Great A. & P. Co., 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1954).
40. See Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
90 S.W.2d 445 (1936). See 1 WiLLISTON, SALEs § 243(a) (3d ed. 1948).
41. See Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938)
Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27. Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
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even though no direct contractual relationship existed.4 2 Later
the courts expressly dispensed with the privity requirement in
food cases. 43  Cases involving products intended for intimate
bodily use were treated as analogous to the food cases and the
privity requirement was likewise discarded. 44
A more circuitous route was taken in eliminating the privity
requirement in cases concerned with mechanical products.
Courts have applied Uniform Commercial Code section 2-318,"
which provides that a warranty extends to members of the fam-
ily 46 of the purchaser or to guests in his home.47 In addition,
another line of cases indicates that if the manufacturer makes
an express representation in the form of an advertisement, he
warrants his product to the public at large and recovery is al-
lowed without a direct contractual relationship. 4 Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors,49 a warranty action by a third party against
the manufacturer and seller of a defective automobile, explicitly
abrogated the privity requirement in cases involving mechanical
products brought on warranty-contract basis.50 After Henning-
sen the only remaining question is whether the product is de-
fective and not fit for the purpose sold5 or not adequate to sup-
42. For an extensive discussion of judicial avoidance of the privity rule, see
Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1957).
43. See Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913). Prosser
lists 16 jurisdictions which have dispensed with the privity requirement in food
cases. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1107 (1960).
44. See, e.g., Graham v. Bottonfield's, 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1957) (hair
dye).
45. "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be af-
fected by the goods and who is injured in person by the breach of the war-
ranty . . .."
46. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1900) illus-
trates the liberal manner in which the courts have interpreted section 2-318.
Plaintiff was an employee of the purchaser; however, the court considered him
a member of the industrial family and thus covered by the warranty.
47. See Thompson v. Reedman Motors, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
48. See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) (ad-
vertisement portraying certain windshields as "shatter-proof"). Cf. Randy Knit-
ware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
49. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
50. While Henningsen contained the first express declaration that privity was
not necessary in a warranty suit, Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (defective cinder blocks
caused property damage), indicated that the manufacturer would be held liable,
in the absence of privity, to the ultimate consumer; however, it was not clearly
stated that privity could be eliminated in a warranty action.
51. This is a utilization of the warranty of fitness for purpose. See Hamon
v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961) ; Morrow v. Caloric Appliance
Co., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963). See also note 37 supra.
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port the uses to which such products are ordinarily put. 2 The
elimination of the privity requirement 53 in warranty actions is
advantageous for the plaintiff who might be unable to show
fault in a negligence action if the manufacturer overcomes the
prima facie presumption created by res ipsa loquitur; conse-
quently, increasing numbers of products cases have been brought
on the warranty theory.5 4
In the past warranty has presented several obstacles to recov-
ery not present in a negligence-tort action: (1) warranty has
traditionally been associated with sale; however, very recently
a New Jersey court has adopted the position that a sale is not
necessary for recovery in products cases;5 (2) for a warranty
of particular purpose to be applicable there must have been reli-
ance on the express representations of the seller; 16 however,
courts have avoided this requirement by making use of the
warranty of general merchantability which does not require
reliance;57 (3) in the past the buyer had to give prompt notice
of a breach of warranty ;58 however, recent cases have dispensed
with the notice requirement ;59 and (4) traditionally, a manufac-
turer has been allowed to disclaim liability or limit it ;60 however,
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors(" rejected the manufacturer's
52. This is a unitization of the warranty of general merchandise. See Hard-
man v. Helene Curtis Industries, 48 11. App. 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964). See
also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 23 (1965)
note 38 supra.
53. For cases following Henningaen, see, e.g., Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General
Motors, 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. App. 1962).
54. Courts using the warranty theory have been careful to point out that
the nature of the breach of warranty in product cases is also a tortious wrong.
In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82
(1963), the court stated: "[A] breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a
violation of the sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious
wrong suable by a non-contracting party whose use of the . . . article is within
the reasonable contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer."
55. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing Co., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965) (employee of lessee allowed recovery).
56. See Dunbar v. Consolidated Iron Steel Mfg. Co., 23 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1928) ; Prosver, Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. Rgv. 117, 168
(1943).
57. See note 2 supra.
58. This requirement was based on the UNIFORM SALES AcT § 49 and the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607. See Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 162
P.2d 801 (1945) ; Johnson v. Kanavos, 296 Mass. 373, 6 N.E.2d 434 (1937).
59. When warranty was extended to include those not in privity the notice
requirement was assumed not to apply. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers To-
bacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). Recent decisions which rest on strict
liability say the notice requirement is not present. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964):
60. See Hamon v. Coonrod, 148 Kan. 146, 79 P.2d 831 (1938).
61 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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plea of disclaimer as against public policy, and this rejection
has been followed in personal injury actions.6 2 The result has
been that warranty no longer protects only bargaining power
but extends to protect human life as well.68 The courts now
view the breach of "warranty" in products cases as a tortious
wrong.6 4 In a recent case "warranty" was held to protect against
inadequacy of value.6 5 Thus it appears that a manufacturer
will be held liable without regard to privity whenever a defect
in his product causes injury. This is a species of absolute
liabilty. 6s
Even though he is liable without fault, the manufacturer is
not considered an insurer.6 7 The injured party must still show
that the product in question has been transferred from the manu-
facturer in a "defective" condition and that the "defect" caused
injury.68 The problem for the court is to determine what is a
defective product. Two general categories have been established:
(1) when the product is not made in the way intended and (2)
when the product was made as intended and still causes injury.
In the former, the courts have adopted a position similar to that
of the Second Restatement of Torts section 402-A6 9 and have
62. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 876, 391 P.2d 168
(1964) ; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 388 S.W.2d 655
(1960).
63. See Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377
P.2d 897, 901 (1962), where Justice Traynor stated that "rules defining and
governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial trans-
actions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those
injured by their defective products unless those rules also serve the purposes for
which such liability is imposed."
64. See note 54 supra.
65. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian Co., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)
(recovery of damages due to loss of value in regard to a defective rug). But see
Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965).
66. See Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 50 Cal.2d 67, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
67. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIAILITY § 16.03(4) (1964).
68. See Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors, 185 A.2d 919 (1962);
1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS L&BiLiTY § 16.01 (1) (1964) ; Comment, 27
Mo. L. REV. 194, 203 (1962).
69. "(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused . . . if
"(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
"(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer . . . in the condition in
which it is sold.
"(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
"(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
"(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
"Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated
imposed liability despite the degree of care exercised by the
manufacturer. 7  When the product is made as intended but
still causes injury, a more difficult question is presented; namely,
whether the product can be considered subject to an inherent
defect because of unsuitability for the purpose intended by the
manufacturer. 71 In Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories,72 a case of
death from allergic reaction to drugs, the court recognized that
there could be liability on a warranty basis if a substantial pro-
portion of users suffered similar reactions. Such a determina-
tion is apparently based on balancing the utility of the product
against the magnitude of the risk. Factors involved in such a
determinaton are: (1) The value society places on the product,
(2) an examination of whether the product could be made safer
and still accomplish its intended purpose, (3) the presence of
adequate warnings and instructions, (4) whether there are safer
substitutes, (5) the necessity of the risk in relation to the use-
fulness of the product, and (6) whether the cost of eliminating
the risk would be prohibitive. 73
Louisiana courts have, in the great majority of cases, made
use of a negligence-tort theory to determine the liability of a
manufacturer for the harm caused by his defective product.7 4
The courts have eliminated the privity requirement in negligence
actions and have also allowed use of res ipsa loquitur to facili-
tate proof.75 LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co.76 es-
in this Section may or may not apply (1) to harm to persons other than the users
or consumers . ..."
70. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
71. See Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr.
754 (1963).
72. 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963).
73. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965),
suggests that the factors to be considered are: "(1) the usefulness and desirability
of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same
need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obvious-
ness of the danger, (5) common knoaledge and normal public expectation of the
danger.. . , (6) the avoidability of injury by care in the use of the product . ..,
and (7) the ability to eliminate the danger . ..."
74. There is limited use of the warranty-contract theory in Louisiana because
of the code warranty against redhibitory vices contemplates a direct, buyer-seller
relationship. See LA. CiL CODE arts. 2476, 2520, 2522, 2531, 2547 (1870). These
articles appear to preclude an ultimate consumer from recovering directly from
a manufacturer; consequently, the negligence theory is preferable because the
privity requirement has been eliminated and res ip8a loquitur is available to the
plaintiff. See Comment, 13 LA. L. R1v. 624 (1953).
75. See Auzenne v. Gulf Public Serv., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938)
Lee v. Smith, 168 So. 727 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936). See also Comment, 22 LA.
L. RLEv. 435 (1962) ; Note, 13 LA. L. RELv. 624 (1953).
76. 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952).
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tablished that in cases involving deleterious food recovery will
lie on the basis of an implied warranty of wholesomeness even
though the action was brought in tort, and the injured party
need not be in privity with the manufacturer. 77 This position
is similar to that of the absolute liability imposed on food and
drug manufacturers at common law. A recent federal decision,
Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,78 indicates that absolute
liability will also be imposed in actions dealing with products
intended for intimate bodily use. Lousiana courts have not had
an opportunity to rule on a products case since the Second Re-
statement of Torts section 402-A 79 was expanded to include
products other than food.
It is submitted that in the future the manufacturer of a prod-
uct which causes injury, either because of a defect not intended
to be present, or a defect due to the nature of the product, will,
be liable for the harm caused. It appears that this liability will
be imposed according to the principles established in the Second
Restatement's section 402-A. A similar position should be
adopted in Louisiana, since the jurisprudence indicates that abso-
lute liability is not inconsistent with the civil law requirement
of fault.8 As a practical matter, this extension is justified
because of mass advertising and sales techniques aimed at the
77. The court, as Justice Hawthorn pointed out in his dissent, ignored the
code articles against redhibitory vices and imposed liability because of the nature
of the business and the manufacturer's advertisements extolling the quality of
the product. Liability was imposed through a warranty-contract theory, the re-
sult being that absolute liability was imposed on the manufacturer. Absolute
liability, however, is not inconsistent with the civilian theory of fault. See LA.
CIVIL CODE arts. 2315, 2316 (1870). The question remains whether the courts
will extend this liability to include products other than food, or whether the
court will interpret article 2315 strictly and require a showing of fault. A strict
interpretation is unlikely because delictual responsibility without dolus (willful
harming) or culpa (negligent harming) is explainable in terms of fault. See
Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Concept of Fault, 27 TUL. L. REV. 1, 14,
19 (1952). Delicts do not have to depend on negligence; rather, they can rest
on absolute liability. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 177 (master liable for damage
caused by whatever is thrown out of his house into street), 2321 (owner who
has turned loose dangerous animal liable) (1870). See also Note, 13 LA. L. REV.
624 (1953) ; Harris, Liability Without Fault, 6 TUL. L. REV. 1 1952).
78. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
79. See note 69 supra. -
80. See note 77 supra. Another possible argument is that the vendor of a prod-
uct is subrogated to his seller's rights and actions in warranty against all others.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2503 (1870). Although this article appears in the section of
the code entitled "Warranty in Case of Eviction," it does not appear to be in-
consistent with the theory of redhibitory vices. If this article were used, a con-
sumer would have a cause of action against the manufacturer through subrogation
to the rights of his vendor (the retailer) and thus would eliminate the question
of privity.
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ultimate consumer who is often unable to show fault. It places
the liability where it should be- on the one who creates the
risk and is best able to bear the consequences.
Charles S. McCowan, Jr.

